Bill Moyers interviews Jack Goldsmith on executive powers
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Stumble ThisIn these two excerpts from Bill Moyers Journal, Jack Goldsmith, former head the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department, gives an insider's view of advising the President on the limits of executive power during the war on terror.
In the second excerpt, Goldsmith recounts what he calls "the most amazing scene I'd ever witnessed"—the night then White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez and former White House chief of staff Andrew Card Gonzalez, went to the hospital to try to persuade Attorney General John Ashcroft to give his permission on a secret surveillance plan, overriding acting Attorney General James Comey.
In the second excerpt, Goldsmith recounts what he calls "the most amazing scene I'd ever witnessed"—the night then White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez and former White House chief of staff Andrew Card Gonzalez, went to the hospital to try to persuade Attorney General John Ashcroft to give his permission on a secret surveillance plan, overriding acting Attorney General James Comey.
Immediately, the job put him at the center of critical debates within the Bush administration about its continuing response to 9/11 — debates about coercive interrogation, secret surveillance and the detention and trial of enemy combatants. [ ... ]
Nine months later, in June 2004, Goldsmith resigned. Although he refused to discuss his resignation at the time, he had led a small group of administration lawyers in a behind-the-scenes revolt against what he considered the constitutional excesses of the legal policies embraced by his White House superiors in the war on terror. During his first weeks on the job, Goldsmith had discovered that the Office of Legal Counsel had written two legal opinions — both drafted by Goldsmith’s friend Yoo, who served as a deputy in the office — about the authority of the executive branch to conduct coercive interrogations. Goldsmith considered these opinions, now known as the “torture memos,” to be tendentious, overly broad and legally flawed, and he fought to change them. He also found himself challenging the White House on a variety of other issues, ranging from surveillance to the trial of suspected terrorists. His efforts succeeded in bringing the Bush administration somewhat closer to what Goldsmith considered the rule of law — although at considerable cost to Goldsmith himself. By the end of his tenure, he was worn out. “I was disgusted with the whole process and fed up and exhausted,” he told me recently. [ ... ]
After leaving the Office of Legal Counsel, Goldsmith was uncertain about what, if anything, he should say publicly about his resignation. His silence came to be widely misinterpreted. After leaving the Justice Department, he accepted a tenured professorship at Harvard Law School, where he currently teaches. During his first weeks in Cambridge, in the fall of 2004, some of his colleagues denounced him for what they mistakenly assumed was his role in drafting the torture memos. One colleague, Elizabeth Bartholet, complained to a Boston Globe reporter that the faculty was remiss in not investigating any role Goldsmith might have played in “justifying torture.” “It was a nightmare,” Goldsmith told me. “I didn’t say anything to defend myself, except that I didn’t do the things I was accused of.”
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Read the full article at NYT Magazine.